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The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship among age, first- and second-order
Theory of Mind and the increasing ability of children to understand and produce different
kinds of communicative acts – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts –
expressed through linguistic and extralinguistic expressive means. To communicate
means to modify an interlocutor’s mental states (Grice, 1989), and pragmatics studies
the inferential processes that are necessary to fill the gap, which often exists in human
communication, between the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterance and what the
speaker intends to communicate to the interlocutor. We administered brief video-clip
stories showing different kinds of pragmatic phenomena – sincere, ironic, and deceitful
communicative acts - and first- and second-order ToM tasks, to 120 children, ranging
in age from 3 to 8 years. The results showed the existence of a trend of difficulty
in children’s ability to deal with both linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic tasks,
from the simplest to the most difficult: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative
acts. A hierarchical regression analysis indicated that age plays a significant role in
explaining children’s performance on each pragmatic task. Furthermore, the hierarchical
regression analysis revealed that first-order ToM has a causal role in explaining children’s
performance in handling sincere and deceitful speech acts, but not irony. We did not
detect any specific role for second-order ToM. Finally, ToM only partially explains the
observed increasing trend of difficulty in children’s pragmatic performance: the variance
in pragmatic performance explained by ToM increases between sincere and deceitful
communicative acts, but not between deceit and irony. The role of inferential ability
in explaining the improvement in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks
investigated is discussed.
Keywords: pragmatics, development, theory of mind, deceit, irony, direct and indirect speech acts
INTRODUCTION
Pragmatic ability refers to the use of language (Levinson, 1983) and other expressive means, such
as non-verbal/extralinguistic means, i.e., gestures and body movements (Bara, 2010), to convey
a specific meaning in a given context. Interesting examples of such ability are indirect speech
acts, meaning acts through which the speaker communicates more than is literally said to the
listener (Searle, 1975); deceitful communicative acts, meaning intentional attempts to manipulate
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the listener’s mental state in order to induce them to
believe something untrue (Perner, 1991); and irony, meaning
communicative acts expressing the opposite of what is meant by
the speaker (Grice, 1989).
Evidence in the literature show that pragmatic ability
correlates with Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff,
1978), i.e., the human ability to attribute mental states to
oneself and to other individuals. Evidence also show that
this ability increases during childhood (Wellman and Liu,
2004) and adolescence (Bosco et al., 2014, 2016; Brizio et al.,
2015). Similarly, the increasing ability of children to manage
these pragmatic phenomena as they grow older has been well
documented in the literature. At around one year of age
children start to understand and use direct speech acts, meaning
utterances that express literally and exactly what the speaker
intends to say (Searle, 1975), in order to communicate with
another person (Garvey, 1984). However, children also become
able to handle indirect speech acts early on in their development.
Reeder (1980), for example, showed that starting from 2;6 years of
age, children understand equally well, in an adequate context, that
direct utterances like ‘I want you to do that’ and indirect requests
like ‘Would you mind doing that?’ have the same conventional
communicative meaning (see also Bernicot and Legros, 1987).
Bucciarelli et al. (2003) also showed that, starting from 2;6 years
of age, children understand direct and conventional forms of
indirect speech acts (“Would you mind” “Do you know?”, etc)
equally well, and that such ability increases with age (see Bosco
and Bucciarelli, 2008).
Studies in the literature have shown that children’s ability to
deal with verbal deceit also increases with age. In particular,
starting from three years of age (Lewis, 1993; Bussey, 1999),
children start using lies, meaning false utterances proffered with
the intention of avoiding a disagreeable consequence such as
a punishment (Leekman, 1992). Talwar and Crossman (2011)
argue, in their review of the literature, that a child’s ability to
lie could be considered normative, testifying the child’s social
and cognitive development. The ability to handle lies of different
complexity evolves during the pre-school to school period: as
they grow up, children become able to consider the speaker’s
intention and the impact of the social acceptability of lying and
they start deceiving (for a review, see Talwar and Crossman,
2011). A deceitful communicative act is a speaker’s intentional
attempt to manipulate the listener’s mental states in order to
induce them to believe something untrue (Perner, 1991). Peskin
(1996) claims that, in order to comprehend deceit, the speaker
must take as shared with the listener something the speaker
does not really believe. Peskin also claims that it is necessary to
understand that the listener thus comes to hold a false belief,
and observes how starting from the age of 4, children fully
comprehend the speaker’s intention to deceive. The ability to
deceive has thus been frequently explained on the basis of the
ability to use a fully developed ToM (Chandler et al., 1989; Polak
and Harris, 1999; Ma et al., 2015). Talwar et al. (2007, p. 804)
for example affirm that “Lying, in essence, is ToM in action”;
to deceive consists of creating a false-belief in the interlocutor’s
mind (Lee, 2000). In particular, Talwar et al. (2007) investigated
the relation between first- and second- order ToM and children’s
ability to lie. First-order ToM involves the comprehension of
another person’s belief about a certain state of the world,
while second-order ToM involves the ability to infer what one
person believes about another person’s thoughts, meaning to
understand nested mental states (Perner and Wimmer, 1985).
Talwar et al. (2007) reported a correlation between 6 and 11-year-
old children’s second-order ToM and the ability to lie. Similarly,
Cheung et al. (2015) found a correlation between 7 and 9-year-
old children’s second-order ToM and their ability to understand a
liar’s intention. The increasing ability of children to manage more
complex forms of deceit has thus been explained on the basis
of the children’s development from first-order to second-order
ToM. However, the exact role of (first- and second-order) ToM
in explaining a growing child’s ability to manage deceit is not
yet completely clear (Talwar and Crossman, 2011). For example,
some authors (Russell et al., 1995), claimed that not yet fully
developed ToM abilities are not the best factor for explaining
children’s difficulty in managing complex deceit, and proposed
that the executive demand (in terms of executive functions as
planning and shifting) that the comprehension of complex deceit
requires is the best explanatory factor. Bosco and Bucciarelli
(2008) also argued that ToM did not seem to be the best factor
for explaining children’s ability to manage deceitful speech acts of
increasing complexity.
Focusing now on irony, in its easiest form, this typically
takes place when an utterance expresses the opposite of what
the speaker means (Grice, 1989). In particular, irony involves
a discrepancy between the literal meaning and the speaker’s
communicative intent (Mey, 2001). Children usually start to
develop the ability to recognize ironic speech acts between five
and six years of age (Dews et al., 1996; Harris and Pexman,
2003; Filippova and Astington, 2010), although younger children
may sometimes also understand irony (Loukusa and Leinonen,
2008; Angeleri and Airenti, 2014) and such ability improves
over time (Demorest et al., 1984; Dews et al., 1996; Dews
and Winner, 1997; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Filippova and
Astington, 2008). Loukusa and Leinonen (2008), for example,
found a significant difference between 6- and 7-year-olds in their
ability to provide a correct explanation in a comprehension task
on a simple ironic utterance, and Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008)
reported that children of 6, 8, and 9 years of age found it easier
to comprehend simple forms of irony, that is, utterances directly
in contrast with the background knowledge, than complex ones,
involving utterances implying knowledge that is in contrast with
the background scenario.
According to Winner (1997), in order to interpret an ironic
utterance correctly, the child must have the ability to detect
incongruity or falsehood, to avoid mistaking irony for error, to
understand another person’s beliefs, and to avoid interpreting
irony as deception. In line with this theoretical proposal, Nilsen
et al. (2011) showed that second-order ToM is correlated
with children’s comprehension of verbal irony. Specifically, they
pointed out that adults and older children aged between 8 and 10,
but not younger children aged 6 to 7 years, were able to recognize
that listeners require contextual knowledge to comprehend irony.
The studies in the literature have mainly focused on one single
pragmatic phenomenon (and its possible relation with ToM) at
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a time, and only a few have undertaken a direct comparison of
the different phenomena (Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bucciarelli
et al., 2003). In particular, Bosco et al. (2012a, 2013) provided a
broad assessment of the abilities of children ranging in age from
5 to 8;6 years, to comprehend and produce: direct and indirect
speech acts (that the authors define as standard communication
acts), and deceitful and ironic communication acts, using both
linguistic and nonverbal/extralinguistic means of expression,
such as gestures and body posture. The authors reported that the
ability to perform all the pragmatic tasks investigated increases
with age in children aged between 5 and 8;6 years, and their ability
to deal with standard communication acts (direct and indirect),
and deceitful and ironic speech acts also improves. In line with
Bucciarelli et al. (2003), the authors explained the existence of
such an increasing trend of difficulty on the basis of the Cognitive
Pragmatic theory (Bara, 2010) and the increasing complexity
of the inferential processes involved in the various pragmatic
tasks investigated. The ability to infer refers to the cognitive
capacity necessary to fill the gap, which often exists, between the
literal meaning of an utterance and what the speaker actually
means (Searle, 1975). According to the Cognitive Pragmatic
theory, in expressing a sincere communicative act (direct and
indirect communicative acts), the actor says something that is
in line with his/her private beliefs. In terms of the inferential
processes involved, the comprehension or production of a sincere
communicative act merely requires the partner to refer to the
background knowledge shared between the interlocutors. By
contrast, the comprehension and production of deceitful and
ironic communicative acts requires more complex inferential
processes. In particular, in deceit, what the speaker says is in
conflict with his private knowledge, but it does not contradict
the knowledge given as shared with the partner. In a case
of deceit, the partner has to recognize the difference between
what is expressed and what the speaker privately entertains. In
irony, the actor’s communicative intention is again in conflict
with his private knowledge, as in the previous case, but it also
contradicts the knowledge given as shared with the partner.
This makes an ironic communicative act more difficult to
entertain than a deceitful one (for a detailed description, see
Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bara,
2010).
However, a possible different explanation for the increasing
trend of difficulty in the comprehension and production of the
pragmatic tasks described above implies a role for ToM, and
in particular it states that ToM could play a greater role in
deceitful communicative acts (Flanagan, 1992; Sodian and Frith,
1992) and ironic communicative acts (Happé, 1993) as compared
to standard (direct and indirect) ones. Winner and Leekman
(1991) assume that it is more difficult to understand irony than
deceit because the former requires second-order ToM, whereas
the latter only requires first-order ToM. In particular, Sullivan
et al. (1995) found that starting from 7 years of age, children can
distinguish lies from jokes, and they attribute this to the acquired
ability to attribute second-order mental states.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have
empirically investigated such a hypothesis by assessing, in the
same sample of participants, the possible role of first- and
second-order ToM in explaining children’s increasing ability
to comprehend and produce sincere (direct and indirect),
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. For this reason, the
aim of the study was to investigate the increasing ability of
children to manage different kinds of pragmatic phenomena,
i.e., direct and indirect, deceitful, and ironic speech acts,
and the possible role of first- and second-order ToM in
explaining such performance. In detail, we wished to replicate
the findings of Bosco et al. (2013, see also Bucciarelli et al.,
2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008), and expected: (i) to find
children’s performance on all the investigated tasks to improve
with age; (ii) to find an increasing trend of difficulty in the
comprehension and production of the investigated pragmatic
phenomena, namely sincere communicative acts (direct and
indirect), and deceitful and ironic communicative acts, in
both the linguistic and non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities,
including the use of gestures and body movements. In particular,
the novelty of the present study was (iii) to explore the causal
role of ToM (first- and second-order) in explaining such an
improvement in their performance, in both the linguistic and
non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities, within each investigated
phenomenon. Moreover, (iv) we investigated the possible role of
ToM in explaining the increasing trend of difficulty we expected
to find across the various pragmatic phenomena investigated.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The sample consisted of 120 Italian children (60 males and 60
females) ranging in age from 3 to 8 years. In order to compare
the subsamples’ performance in a more reliable way, the sample
was organized in 4 age groups so that there was a one year
difference between one age group and the next: Group A (3 years;
6 months – 4 years) (M = 3;10; SD = 0;2); Group B (5–5;6)
(M = 5;3; DS = 0;2); Group C (6;6–7) (M = 6;10; DS = 0;2);
Group D (8–8;6) (M = 8;3; DS = 0;3). Each age group was
composed of 30 children and was balanced for gender, including
an equal number of males and females.
The children were recruited from four different schools in
the Piedmont area (Italy). Research assistants visited the schools
before data collection commenced, and provided the teachers
with details about the study. A letter containing all the details
about the research was sent to the children’s families, together
with an informed consent form, which the parents were required
to complete. Only children whose parents gave their consent were
included in the sample.
Material
The experimental protocol consisted of a selection of 48 items
taken from the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the
ABaCo (Sacco et al., 2008; Angeleri et al., 2012; Bosco et al.,
2012a), a validated assessment tool to evaluate pragmatic abilities
in typical (Bosco et al., 2013) and atypical (Angeleri et al.,
2016) development. Examples of ABaCo items are provided in
Appendix A.
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For each expressive modality (i.e., linguistic and
extralinguistic), the experimental task contained the same
number and structure of items, and assessed the same type
of pragmatic phenomena (half in comprehension and half in
production):
- 8 sincere communicative acts, namely 4 direct and 4 indirect
communicative acts;
- 8 deceitful communicative acts;
- 8 ironic communicative acts.
Each item consists of a video lasting 20–25 s, comprising a
controlled number of words (range: 7 ± 2), and representing a
communicative interaction between two people. The linguistic
items investigate pragmatic phenomena expressed primarily
through linguistic means, while the extralinguistic items are
composed of communicative acts expressed through gestures (for
a detailed description of the items, see Bosco et al., 2013).
In comprehension tasks, participants observed an interaction
between two actors, and they were required to understand what
was communicated (e.g., In your opinion, what did the girl want
to say to the boy?). In production tasks, participants observed
only the initial part of an interaction, and they were asked to
produce a communicative act appropriate with respect to the
proposed communicative situation (e.g., The child doesn’t want
to be discovered. What could he say?).
For each pragmatic task, it was possible to obtain a score of
“0” when the answer was considered incorrect and “1” when the
answer was considered correct. More details concerning scoring
criteria are reported in Appendix A (see also Sacco et al., 2008;
Bosco et al., 2013). Inter-rater reliability was calculated using
Cohen’s Kappa on the scores assigned to 40 randomly selected
children (about 33% of the total sample): K was 0.67 (p < 0.001)
95% CI (0.653, 0.696), indicating substantial agreement (Landis
and Koch, 1977).
In addition to the pragmatic tasks, a number of ToM tests
were administered to the children. See Appendix B for a detailed
description of the items.
Sally and Ann Task
In this task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), the child is required to
observe a scene acted out by two paper dolls, Sally and Ann: Sally
places her ball in the basket and leaves the scene. Ann moves the
ball from the basket to the box. Then the child is required to reply
to a test question (When Sally comes back, where does she think
the ball is?) and a justification question (Why does Sally think the
ball is there?). A score of 1 is gained when both the test and the
justification questions are answered correctly.
Modified Smarties Task
This is a revised version of the original task developed by Perner
et al. (1987). Because nowadays many children are no longer
familiar with the famous candy brand, we introduced a packet
of a currently famous brand of potato chips as the target object.
During the task, the experimenter shows the packet of chips to
every child and asks: What is in there? Then the experimenter
opens the packet, showing that it contains pencils rather than
the expected chips. The next question is: What will someone
else, who has not seen what the packet contains, think is in there,
before it is opened? A score of 1 is obtained when the child
replies “chips” and a score of 0 is attributed to any other kind
of answer.
John and Mary and Maxi Stories
These tasks (Sullivan et al., 1995) are a modified version of
those used by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and Perner and
Wimmer (1985) respectively, and they are told using cardboard
puppets in order to reduce the memory load. The two stories
assess second-order ToM, and they have an identical structure
but different characters and settings. In the Maxi story, for
example, the scenario is the following: Maxi and Bobby are
in their kitchen when their mother brings in some chocolate.
Maxi would like to have some chocolate and his mom tells
him he can have some after walking the dog. Unbeknownst to
Maxi but not to Bobby, their mother takes the chocolate to the
neighbor’s place. Unbeknownst to Bobby, Maxi discovers that their
mom has taken the chocolate to the neighbor’s place. Bobby then
goes to look for Maxi in the yard. His mother tells him that
Maxi has gone to get some chocolate. The task consists of a
‘second-order ignorance question’ (i.e., Does Bobby know that
Maxi knows where the chocolate is?) and a ‘second-order belief
question’ (i.e., Where does Bobby go to look for Maxi?). Along
with the story-telling, a number of factual questions (e.g., Why
is Maxi in the yard?) and first-order ToM questions (e.g., Does
Maxi know where the chocolate is now?) were used to help the
children to follow the storyline, but they were not taken into
account in the scoring procedure. The children’s answers could
be scored 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect) for both second-order
ignorance and belief questions. The mean value of the scores
obtained from the two test questions was run to perform the
analyses.
Picture Sequencing Task
Within the present study, just part of the original task (Langdon
and Coltheart, 1999; Porter et al., 2008) was administered: the
tasks used comprise six stories, including two social scripts (more
than one person interacting in everyday social routines) and four
false-belief sequences (a person, unaware of an event in a story,
acts on a false belief). Internal consistency among these items was
calculated (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.77). Each story was depicted in a
set of four black-and-white picture cards. Two practice runs were
used to allow the child to become familiar with the procedure of
the task, and these were not considered in the scoring procedure.
The set of cards for each story was placed face down in front
of the child, and the child was required to arrange the cards
in the correct order to tell the story according to the logical
sequence of events, like in a comic-strip. Scores ranged from 0–6;
each sequence scored 2 points if the first card was in the correct
position, 2 points if the last card was in the correct position, and
1 point for each of the second and third cards being in the correct
positions. Failure to produce a sequence was scored as 0.
Inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa also
for ToM tasks scores attributed by two raters in about 33% of the
total sample: Sally and Ann task, Modified Smarties task, John
and Mary and Maxi Stories task. It was not calculated on the
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Picture Sequencing task scores, because the scoring procedures
for this test only involve comparing the order of the sequences
provided by the child with the correct ones provided by the test
instructions. Since no different interpretation is possible, we did
not consider it necessary to have a second rater for such scores. K
ranged from 0.76 to 1 (p< 0.001), indicating substantial to almost
perfect agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977).
Procedure
The experimenters visited the schools before the beginning of
the study, in order to familiarize with the children. The children
dealt with the experimental tasks in a single individual session,
lasting approximately 50 min and performed in a quiet room at
the school. The video-taped stories were shown to the children
one at a time, using a portable computer, and each session was
video-recorded, to allow oﬄine coding procedures. The tasks
were presented in two different random orders, A and B; the
participants in each group were balanced for age and gender,
and were assigned to order A or B of the protocol in a balanced
way. The ToM tests were also balanced, so that they were
presented to half of the participants before the presentation of
the pragmatic protocol and to half of the participants after the
presentation of the pragmatic protocol. Moreover, the ToM tasks
were presented in two different random orders (first-order tasks
followed by second-order tasks and vice versa). When performing
the analyses, first- and second-order ToM scores were considered
separately. In particular, the first-order ToM value was obtained
using the average scores gained from the Sally and Ann, Smarties,
and Picture Sequencing tasks. Likewise, the second-order ToM
value was obtained by combining the average scores obtained
from the John and Mary and Maxi tasks.
Data Analysis
The distribution of scores for each kind of task was not normal
in most age groups. In particular, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test showed the distribution to be normal only in a few cases,
namely extralinguistic deceit in group B and extralinguistic
irony in both groups C and D, while data were not normally
distributed in any of the other cases: linguistic sincere acts
0.001 < p < 0.011; linguistic deceit 0.001 < p < 0.042;
linguistic irony: 0.001 < p < 0.027; extralinguistic sincere
acts p < 0.001; extralinguistic deceit: 0.001 < p < 0.200;
extralinguistic irony 0.001 < p < 0.181. We also performed
a Shapiro–Wilk test, which confirmed the previous results:
the distribution of scores was normal in only a few cases,
namely linguistic irony in group D, extralinguistic deceit in
group B, and extralinguistic irony in groups C and D; data
were, instead, not normally distributed in any of the other
cases: linguistic sincere acts.001 < p < 0.022; linguistic deceit
0.001 < p < 0.010; linguistic irony 0.001 < p < 0.164;
extralinguistic sincere acts 0.002 < p < 0.010; extralinguistic
deceit 0.001< p< 0.178; extralinguistic irony 0.001< p< 0.214.
We thus conducted an arcsine transformation on the children’s
answers in each pragmatic task (linguistic and extralinguistic
sincere communicative acts, deceit, and irony) and each ToM
task (first- and second-order). We were thus able to perform
parametric analyses while satisfying the required assumptions.
To investigate children’s performance in managing different
kinds of pragmatic tasks, we conducted a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA), with age as between-subject factor (type of
age group: Group A 3;6–4, Group B 5–5;6, Group C 6;6–7, and
Group D 8–8;6) and performance at sincere communicative act,
deceit, and irony as dependent variables on both the linguistic
and the extralinguistic scales. Analogously, children’s ability
to manage different kinds of ToM tasks was investigated by
conducting a MANOVA with age as between-subject factor (type
of age group: Group A 3;6–4, Group B 5–5;6, Group C 6;6–7, and
Group D 8–8;6) and performance at first- and second-order ToM
tasks as dependent variables.
Moreover, in order to investigate the effect of performance
on the different pragmatic tasks within each age group (type
of pragmatic phenomena: sincere, deceit, irony), we performed
separate ANOVA analyses, for both linguistic and extralinguistic
tasks.
In order to investigate the correlation between pragmatic and
ToM ability, we calculated the partial correlation (Pearson’s r,
controlling for age) between children’s performance on pragmatic
and ToM tasks in the overall sample.
Lastly, in order to investigate the specific effect of age
and of first- and second-order ToM in explaining children’s
pragmatic performance, we conducted a hierarchical regression
analysis, including three steps: Age (step1), first-order ToM
(step2) and second-order ToM (step3). Such variables were
entered into the regression model as predictors to detect
their impact on children’s performance on the pragmatic
tasks (i.e., sincere, deceit and irony). Statistically significant
correlations were found between linguistic and extralinguistic
performance on the different types of tasks: sincere (r = 0.29;
p = 0.001), deceit (r = 0.74; p < 0.001), irony (r = 0.63;
p < 0.001). For this reason, and since the trends in scores
were the same for both modalities in all age groups, in this
regression analysis we collapsed the scores obtained for the
linguistic and extralinguistic tasks into a single type of pragmatic
task score. Despite the differences implied in these pragmatic
phenomena, collapsing them into a single score provides a
more statistically robust measure of overall pragmatic ability
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.93).
RESULTS
The scores obtained by each age group on the pragmatic and ToM
tasks are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
In Tables 3 and 4 the correlation coefficients among pragmatic
tasks and ToM tasks, respectively, are provided.
On the linguistic scale, the MANOVA revealed a significant
effect of age on the pragmatic performance [F(9,348) = 8.97;
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.19]. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the
outcome variables revealed a significant effect of age on
deceits [F(3,116) = 36.77; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.49] and ironies
[F(3,116) = 12.09; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.24] but a not significant
effect on sincere communicative acts [F(3,116) = 2.12; p = 0.10;
η2 = 0.05]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni) between
the performance of A vs. B, B vs. C and C vs. D age group at each
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TABLE 1 | Performance of each age group at the pragmatic tasks, mean (standard deviation).
Linguistic Scale Extralinguistic Scale
Sincere Deceit Irony Sincere Deceit Irony
Age Group
A (3;6–4) 0.75 (0.18) 0.34 (0.30) 0.15 (0.17) 0.44 (0.28) 0.19 (0.19) 0.06 (0.11)
B (5–5;6) 0.73 (0.16) 0.70 (0.30) 0.38 (0.23) 0.64 (0.26) 0.53 (0.30) 0.28 (0.30)
C (6;6–7) 0.79 (0.13) 0.93 (0.10) 0.45 (0.24) 0.84 (0.12) 0.81 (0.17) 0.43 (0.28)
D (8–8;6) 0.83 (0.12) 0.91 (0.12) 0.49 (0.22) 0.83 (0.13) 0.88 (0.13) 0.47 (0.28)
Overall sample 0.77 (0.15) 0.72 (0.33) 0.37 (0.25) 0.68 (0.27) 0.60 (0.34) 0.31 (0.30)
TABLE 2 | Performance of each age group at the Theory of Mind (ToM)
tasks.
First-order
ToM
Second-order
ToM
ToM overall
Age Group
A (3;6–4) 0.29 (0.25) 0.30 (0.29) 0.29 (0.23)
B (5–5;6) 0.53 (0.29) 0.40 (0.25) 0.46 (0.22)
C (6;6–7) 0.74 (0.24) 0.54 (0.25) 0.64 (0.20)
D (8–8;6) 0.80 (0.17) 0.62 (0.28) 0.71 (0.17)
Overall sample 0.59 (0.31) 0.47 (0.29) 0.53 (0.26)
pragmatic task highlighted the following results: no differences
were detected among the groups at the sincere acts (p = 1.0);
the groups performed significantly differently at the deceitful acts
(p < 0.001), with the only exception being Group C vs. Group
D, which showed no differences (p = 1.0); finally, at the ironic
tasks, a significant difference was found between Group A and
B (p = 0.003), while no differences were detected between the
remaining groups (0.999 < p < 1.0).
In terms of the extralinguistic scale, the MANOVA revealed
a significant effect of age on the pragmatic performance
[F(9,348) = 10.11; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.21]. Separate univariate
ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed a significant effect
of age on all the communicative acts investigated: sincere
[F(3,116) = 20.51; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.35], deceits [F(3,116) = 48.63;
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.56] and ironies [F(3,116) = 13.18; p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.25]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni) between
the performance of each age group at each pragmatic task
highlighted the following results: the groups performed
significantly differently at the sincere (0.003 < p < 0.016) and
deceitful acts (p < 0.001), with the only exception being Group
C vs. Group D, which showed no differences both at sincere
(p = 1.0) and at deceitful acts (p = 0.863); for what concerns
ironies, again a significant difference was found between Group
A and B (p = 0.033), while no differences were detected between
the remaining groups (0.235 < p < 1.0).
The ANOVA analyses performed within each age group
separately and concerning the linguistic tasks, revealed an effect
of the type of task in all age groups [20.09 < F(2,58) < 57.06;
p< 0.001; 0.41< η2 < 0.66]. Moreover, introducing contrasts for
each analysis, we detected a linear contrast, depending on the type
of pragmatic task in each age group [25.39 < F(1,29) < 145.53;
p < 0.001;.47 < η2 < 0.83]. The same pattern of results was
TABLE 3 | Correlations of pragmatic tasks scores.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Linguistic scale - Sincere –
(2) Linguistic scale – Deceit 0.28∗∗ –
(3) Linguistic scale – Irony −0.01 0.51∗∗ –
(4) Extralinguistic scale – Sincere 0.38∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.35∗∗ –
(5) Extralinguistic scale – Deceit 0.21∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.69∗∗ –
(6) Extralinguistic scale – Irony −0.04 0.45∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.57∗∗ –
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
TABLE 4 | Correlations of I and II order ToM tasks.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Sally & Ann task; First-order ToM –
(2) Smarties task; First-order ToM 0.39∗∗ –
(3) Picture Sequencing task; First-order ToM 0.43∗∗ 0.32∗∗ –
(4) Ice Cream Story task. Second-order ToM 0.44∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.30∗∗ –
(5) Maxy task. Second-order ToM 0.22∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.39∗∗ –
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
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found concerning extralinguistic tasks: an effect of the type of
task was detected in all age groups [14.21 < F(2,58) < 36.48;
p < 0.001; 0.33 < η2 < 0.56] and contrast analysis revealed a
linear contrast, depending on the type of pragmatic task in each
age group [24.60 < F(1,29) < 39.10; p < 0.001; 0.46 < η2 < 0.61].
In terms of children’s ability to manage different kinds of
ToM tasks, the MANOVA revealed a significant effect of age
on the children’s performance [F(6,232) = 10.86; p < 0.001;
η2 = 0.22]. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome
variables revealed a significant effect of age on first-order
ToM performance [F(3,116) = 27.60; p < 0.001; η2 = 0.42] as
well as on second-order ToM performance [F(3,116) = 7.37;
p< 0.001; η2 = 0.16]. Post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni)
between the performance of each age group at first-and second
order ToM tasks revealed the following results: the groups
performed significantly differently at the first-order ToM tasks
(0.003 < p < 0.005) with the only exception being Group C vs.
Group D, which showed no differences (p = 1.0); at the second-
order tasks, no differences were found between the performance
of the age groups (0.512 < p < 1.0).
Partial correlation coefficients between linguistic and
extralinguistic pragmatic tasks (comprehension and production
ability) and overall ToM ability (first- and second-order tasks)
are reported in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, we found a significant correlation
between overall ToM tasks and all the pragmatic tasks
investigated, in both the Linguistic and Extralinguistic scales,
with the only exception of sincere linguistic communicative acts
and Extralinguistic irony. The same result applies for first-order
ToM tasks. By contrast, the only significant relation we detected
for second-order ToM tasks was between linguistic deceit and
second-order ToM.
Table 6 displays the results of multiple hierarchical regression
analysis on the overall sample. In particular it shows all the
coefficients of the regression models as well as the information
about the summary of the model: adjusted regression coefficients
(R2Adj.) for each predictor variable, the change in R2 after the
addition of first- and second-order ToM (R2Change), the change
in F (FChange), and its significance value (Sig. FChange).
The regression analysis revealed that age (Step 1) explains 26%
of the variance in children’s performance on sincere tasks, 53% on
deceitful tasks and 26% on ironic tasks. The model also including
children’s performance on first-order ToM tasks as a regressor
(Step 2) only significantly improved the prediction for sincere
(i.e., direct and indirect communicative acts) and deceitful tasks,
but not for ironic ones. The addition of scores for performance on
second-order ToM tasks (Step 3) did not improve the prediction
for any of the pragmatic tasks.
As a final point, the analyses also showed that within both
the model including first-order ToM (Step 2) and the model
comprising second-order ToM (Step 3), R2 only partially follows
the trend of increasing difficulty exhibited by children in solving
pragmatic problems, when considering both linguistic and
extralinguistic tasks, i.e., first-order ToM (sincere, R2 = 0.304;
deceit, R2 = 0.558; irony R2 = 0.269), second-order ToM
(sincere, R2 = 0.310; deceit, R2 = 0.565; irony R2 = 0.269). In
particular, the R2 value increases across tasks between sincere
and deceitful communicative acts, but not between deceitful and
ironic ones.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to investigate the possible role
of ToM – both first- and second-order - in explaining children’s
ability to comprehend and produce different kinds of pragmatic
phenomena, namely sincere (direct and indirect), deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts, expressed through linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic modalities.
First of all, and in line with our expectation and the relevant
literature (Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008;
Filippova and Astington, 2010; Talwar and Crossman, 2011;
Bosco et al., 2013), overall our results showed that children’s
ability to comprehend and produce the pragmatic phenomena
investigated increases with age, in both the linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic modalities. Analyzing deeper this result
for each pragmatic task and comparing age groups we found
that, for the linguistic modality, children showed no differences
at the sincere acts, while performed significantly differently at
the deceitful acts with the only exception of oldest groups
of age of 6- vs. 8- year-olds children; for what concern
ironic acts, younger group of 3- year-olds children showed a
significant worse performance than all the other groups, while
children belonging to the remaining age groups had comparable
performance. We explain such results on the base of the Cognitive
Pragmatic theory, proposing that, because of the inferential
process involved, sincere communicative acts are the easiest
task to solve for children and thus they performed quite well
starting from 3;6–4 years of age. Always following the tenets
of the Cognitive Pragmatic theory a deceitful communicative
TABLE 5 | Partial correlation (Pearson r, controlling for age) between overall ToM tasks (first- and second-order) and pragmatic tasks, in the overall
group.
Linguistic Scale Extralinguistic Scale
Sincere Deceit Irony Sincere Deceit Irony
First-order ToM tasks 0.14 0.30∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.19∗ 0.20∗ –0.02
Second-order ToM tasks 0.12 0.19∗ 0.14 0.16 0.14 –0.07
Overall ToM 0.15 0.32∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.25∗ 0.23∗ –0.05
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
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TABLE 6 | Hierarchical regression analysis: pragmatic tasks (linguistic and extralinguistic) in the overall group.
DVs IVs B SE B β t p R2 R2Adj R2Change FChange Sig. FChange
Pragmatic task
Sincere Step 1
-Age 0.007 0.001 0.517 6.554 0.001 0.267 0.261 – 42.952 0.001
Step 2
-Age 0.005 0.001 0.366 3.743 0.001 0.304 0.292 0.037 6.291 0.014
-First-order ToM 0.157 0.063 0.245 2.508 0.014
Step 3
-Age 0.005 0.001 0.351 3.549 0.001 0.310 0.292 0.006 0.962 0.329
-First-order ToM 0.138 0.066 0.215 2.100 0.038
-Second-order ToM 0.057 0.058 0.086 0.981 0.329
Deceit Step 1
-Age 0.017 0.002 0.725 0.725 0.001 0.526 0.522 – 130.858 0.001
Step 2
-Age 0.014 0.002 0.586 0.586 0.001 0.558 0.550 0.032 8.457 0.004
-First-order ToM 0.255 0.088 0.227 0.227 0.004
Step 3
-Age 0.014 0.002 0.570 0.570 0.001 0.565 0.553 0.007 1.837 0.178
-First-order ToM 0.218 0.092 0.194 0.194 0.019
-Second-order ToM 0.110 0.081 0.094 0.094 0.178
Irony Step 1
-Age 0.008 0.001 0.514 6.508 0.001 0.264 0.258 – 42.349 0.001
Step 2 0.269 0.257 0.005 0.829 0.364
-Age 0.007 0.001 0.458 4.570 0.001
-First-order ToM 0.064 0.070 0.091 0.910 0.364
Step 3
-Age 0.007 0.002 0.457 4.486 0.001 0.269 0.250 0.000 0.006 0.938
-First-order ToM 0.062 0.074 0.089 0.842 0.402
-Second-order ToM 0.005 0.065 0.007 0.077 0.938
Variables significantly predicting pragmatic performance is marked in bold.
act represents a more difficult pragmatic task to solve and only
starting from 6;6–7 years of age children handle it without
errors. Finally, irony is the most difficult task to solve and
it represents a really hard task to manage for children as
young as 3;6–4 years of age. However, it remains a quite
difficult task also for the older children. Globally considered
the same pattern of results and the same explanation hold for
the extralinguistic modality; the only exception is represented
by the younger 3- and 5- years-olds, who showed differences
in performance at sincere communicative acts. A possible
explanation for this difference is that the extralinguistic modality
was harder for 3- and 5- year-olds children to deal with and
this additional difficulty allowed this difference in performance
to emerge.
In line with our hypothesis, and considering each age
group separately, we also found an increasing trend of
difficulty in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks
investigated: children were able to comprehend and produce
sincere communicative acts more accurately than deceit, which
was followed by ironic speech acts, which were the most difficult
task to deal with. Considered overall, this linear increase in
difficulty holds in both the linguistic and extralinguistic modality
following the patterns of results found in previous studies
(Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al.,
2013).
The novelty of the present research was to explore the
causal role of age and ToM – both first- and second-order
- in explaining children’s pragmatic performance, in both
the linguistic and non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities. Some
authors have indeed proposed that pragmatics/communicative
ability involves mentalizing, i.e., ToM, abilities (Sperber and
Wilson, 2002; Tirassa et al., 2006a,b; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008;
Fernandez, 2011; Bosco et al., 2012b; Cummings, 2015). In
line with this proposal we found a correlation, controlling for
age, between overall ToM tasks (first- and second-order tasks)
and linguistic and extralinguistic irony and deceit, but not
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between linguistic sincere communicative acts and extralinguistic
irony. The same pattern of results holds for first-order ToM.
Considering second-order ToM, we only found a significant
correlation with linguistic deceit.
The correlation we found between children’s performance
on ToM tasks (overall and first-order) and sincere acts
may be considered a surprising result. We can explain this
result by considering that half of the items making up our
experimental material were indirect communicative acts. Studies
in the literature have suggested that ToM has a role in the
comprehension of indirect speech acts. For example, Corcoran
et al. (1995) and Corcoran (2003) showed that patients with
schizophrenia, a disorder explained (e.g., Frith, 1994) on the
basis of a primary deficit in ToM, have difficulties in the
comprehension of indirect speech acts.
Our results concerning the correlation between ToM (overall
and first-order) and deceit are in line with the current literature
(see for example Chandler et al., 1989; Polak and Harris, 1999;
Ma et al., 2015). In particular, our result regarding the significant
role played by second-order ToM in dealing with deceitful acts
is in line with Talwar and Lee (2008). The authors showed
that the performance of children aged from 3 to 8 years on
second-order ToM tasks is related to their ability to maintain
a plausible explanation in order to not reveal their lies. Some
authors also found that second-order ToM ability correlates
with pro-social lies (Cheung et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2016),
which are considered more sophisticated than lies. In particular,
Broomfield et al. (2002) found that only pro-social, but not
other forms of lies, are related to second-order ToM. However,
our experimental material did not include pro-social lies, so
a direct comparison is not possible. Our results concerning
the correlation between ToM (second-order) and irony are
also consistent with the literature, in particular with Winner
(1997), who argued for the role of second-order ToM in irony
comprehension and Nilsen et al. (2011), who reported that
second order ToM is correlated with children’s comprehension
of verbal irony.
Taken globally, our results are also in line with the
literature concerning autism, a pathology characterized by a ToM
impairment (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and showing how people
with autism have difficulties in comprehending and producing
indirect, deceitful and ironic communicative acts (Happé, 1993;
Angeleri et al., 2016, for a review see Loukusa and Moilanen,
2009).
However, in order to conduct an in-depth investigation
of the possible role of age and of first- and second-
order ToM in explaining the improvement in children’s
performance across each pragmatic task (linguistic and non-
verbal/extralinguistic), we performed a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis. We found that, as expected, age has a
significant role in explaining children’s performance on all the
investigated tasks. The results also showed, consistently with
the correlation analysis, a significant role for first-order ToM
in explaining children’s performance in the comprehension and
production of sincere (direct and indirect) communicative acts
as well as their ability to manage deceitful communicative
acts. By contrast, we did not detect any significant role for
second-order ToM in explaining any of the pragmatic tasks
investigated, thus testifying, when the role of age and first-
order ToM is kept under control, a limited causal role of
this more sophisticated ToM aspect in explaining children’s
ability to deal with sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative
acts.
A direct comparison of this result with the current literature
is not possible, since other studies (see for example Talwar and
Lee, 2008; Nilsen et al., 2011) usually limit their investigation
to the correlation analyses. An exception is the study by
Angeleri and Airenti (2014) where, despite the significant
correlation found between ToM (first and second-order) ability
and the comprehension of linguistic ironic tasks, a more detailed
investigation, run through path analysis, underlined that ToM
had no direct effect on humor comprehension. In line with the
results provided by Angeleri and Airenti (2014), our hierarchical
regression analysis showed that, when the role of age is kept
under control, neither first- nor second-order ToM has a direct
impact on children’s performance on irony tasks. Our finding
thus did not provide empirical support to theories proposing
that ToM (Happé, 1993) and specifically second-order ToM
(Winner and Leekman, 1991), plays a key role in explaining
irony comprehension. Furthermore, the results of the present
investigation, in addition to those of Angeleri and Airenti (2014)
indicate that to use ironic statements - it is for example the case
of some items composing the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) –
could not be not a reliable measure to investigate ToM ability in
children.
Lastly, we now wish to focus on the role of ToM in
explaining the increasing trend of difficulty shown by children
in dealing with sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative
acts, using both Linguistic and Extralinguistic expressive means.
We found that ToM, neither first- or second- order, could
be considered the best factor explaining our incresasing trend
of difficulty in children’s performance. Indeed, we found that
R2 only partially follows the trend of increasing difficulty
exhibited by children in solving each kind of investigated task,
i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. The R2
value indicates how much variance is explained by a certain
variable. If ToM (both first- and second-order) was the factor
that best explained the difference in difficulty among the three
tasks, we would expect the R2 value to increase according
to the level of difficulty detected in managing linguistic and
extralinguistic sincere communicative acts, deceit, and irony.
However, this value increases when considering sincere and
deceitful communicative acts, but not when considering deceit
and irony.
To summarize, our results on the existence of an increasing
trend of difficulty across pragmatic tasks seem only partially
explained by the role of ToM (see also Bosco and Gabbatore,
2017). Considered overall, our results suggest a role for
first-order ToM in explaining the differences in performance
only when considering sincere and deceitful acts, but not
when considering deceit and irony. A possible alternative
explanation for the existence of such an increasing trend of
difficulty is based on the inferential complexity underlying
the pragmatic tasks investigated (see Bucciarelli et al., 2003;
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Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al., 2013). The existence
of an increasing trend of difficulty in the comprehension and
production of sincere (direct and indirect), deceitful, and ironic
communicative acts has been experimentally demonstrated, not
only in studies on children (see Bosco et al., 2009, 2012c), but
also through the assessment of pragmatic abilities in patients
with schizophrenia (Colle et al., 2013), and individuals with brain
injury (Bara et al., 2001; Angeleri et al., 2008), left brain damage
(Gabbatore et al., 2014), and right brain damage (Parola et al.,
2016). Other authors in the literature have also highlighted the
key role that the inferential processes play in the comprehension
process (Leinonen et al., 2000). In particular Pexman and
Glenwright (2007) highlighted the role of inferential ability in the
comprehension of an ironic statement.
A limit of the present investigation is that it does not
consider the role that other cognitive functions, such as
executive functions like planning, working memory, inhibition,
and shifting, might play in explaining the development of
children’s communicative-pragmatic performance. In future, it
might be useful to conduct a longitudinal study in order to
observe the development of pragmatic abilities in a specific group
of children over time. Even though the present investigation
focuses on pragmatics, a further interesting topic of study
is the influence of linguistic development on children’s ToM
ability. As a final point, the merit of the present study
was to help to clarify the (limited) causal role of first- and
second-order ToM in explaining the improvement in children’s
pragmatic performance across different kinds of pragmatic
tasks, such as sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative
acts.
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